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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
WHERE NECESSARY.
This appeal does not rely principally on contested findings.
In the limited instances where the Petitioner contests the
Court's findings the evidence has been marshaled.

Rather, the

appeal refers to mistaken legal standards employed by the Court
in connection with:
1.

The custody of the parties1 two children;

2.

The failure to articulate facts to support an early

termination of alimony;
3.

The failure to conclude, as a matter of law, that the

family home was a commingled asset;

4.

The failure to conclude that the Respondent dissipated a

marital asset in the form of cash on hand in the family
construction company.
The Court found that, but for the "influence" of Pedro
Sauer, " . . .

it is clearly in the best interests of the

children to be awarded to Ann Thomas." (emphasis added) (Findings
of Fact f 79)

That finding is not disputed by either party.

The

only findings of fact disputed by the Petitioner relate to Mr.
Sauer's character.

Specifically, the Appellant objects to the

finding by the Court that Mr. Sauer was a "convicted criminal"
(Findings of Fact f 77) and, apparently a spouse abuser (Findings
of Fact 5 78). There is no evidence to support these findings.
In fact, the Court concludes in its earlier Findings of Fact that
the spouse abuse charge was simply an allegation, and that Mr.
Sauer had only been charged with a possession of a firearm, and
not convicted of that charge (Findings of Fact 5 73).
There are no findings which would explain the Court's early
termination of alimony and therefore those findings are not
contested.

The Appellant specifically does not object to the

findings regarding the amount of alimony.
The Appellant did, in its principal brief, contest the
evidence to support the Court's finding that the marital home had
a value of $150,000 at the time of the marriage.

However, the

Respondent's observation that this objection was not preserved at
trial by way of an objection, is well taken.

Nevertheless, where

sixty five percent (65%) of the home was constructed during the
2

marriage, the home is, as a matter of law, a commingled asset
which has lost its identity as a separate asset.
Lastly, the Appellant claims that the Court should have
found some value to Bert Thomas Construction Company, and its
hard assets in particular.

These assets included cash on hand.

The Court should have attributed a value to Bert Thomas
Construction Company which included the cash on hand at the time
of separation where that cash was dissipated by the Respondent in
order to pay his support obligations under the temporary order.
II.
THE COURT GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE CHARACTER
OF A NON-COHABITANT, THIRD PARTY IN CHANGING
CUSTODY TO THE RESPONDENT.
Mr. Thomas argues that this was a "close call11 case.
Court's findings do not support that argument.

The

The Court

specifically found that it was clearly in the best interests of
the children to be awarded to their mother for custodial
purposes, except for the "influence" of Pedro Sauer.

The issue

is: under what circumstances should the character of a noncohabitant third party be determinative of custodial issues?
The Court found that the relationship between Ms. Thomas and
Mr. Sauer was "fairly discrete". (Findings of Fact f78).
Additionally, the evaluators could make no "link" between the
affair and its impact on the children.

(Findings of Fact f 78).

What is notably missing from any testimony, evidence or Court
finding is any suggestion that:
1.

Ann Thomas1 parenting ability was impaired; and,
3

2.

That Mr. Sauer had somehow injured or harmed the

children or that Ms. Thomas permitted such behavior.
In fact the Respondent's own expert, Dr. Jensen, was not
able to observe any negative impact on the children by virtue of
Mr. Sauerfs presence. (Trial Transcript Volume 1,

Page 64, Lines

2-17)-1
The Court did find that this is a complicated case with no
easy, clear cut answers only because of the undue weight given
the character or "influence" of Mr. Sauer2.

Mr. Sauer was not a

cohabitant and there was no evidence that his limited exposure to
the children had negatively influenced them.
Instead of findings that would demonstrate Ms. Thomas1
impaired parenting ability, or how Mr. Sauer has impacted the
best interests of the children, the Court includes pages of
findings that relate only to Mr. Sauerfs character.

These

findings, in addition to being irrelevant to the issue of
custody, are troublesome for other reasons.
First of all, the findings are inconsistent and not
supported by the evidence.

Specifically, the Court notes that

Mr. Sauer has been charged with criminal behavior and spouse

^his fact, along with the Statements of Fact of the
Petitioner in the principal brief and have not been disputed by
the Respondent/Appellee.
2

Specifically the Court found: "the appearance of Seiior
Pedro Sauer in an emotional and sexual relationship with Ann
Thomas during the marriage is a very complicating factor".
(Finding of Fact J[ 71) (emphasis added)
4

abuse but then goes on to conclude that he is a convicted
criminal, and that he is an abuser.
The Court notes that Mr. Sauer is not a citizen of the
United States.

Furthermore, he is Brazilian and that he is

suave, debonair, irresponsible, and a womanizer and not ". . . a
positive role model for little Joseph" (Findings of Fact f80).
It is clear that the Court had some previous impression of
Brazilian culture and particularly male members of that culture.
This was the basis for the Court's own examination of Dr.
Elizabeth Stewart at the time of her testimony (Trial Transcript,
Volume 2, Page 43, Lines 10-14).

The Court was "profoundly

concerned" over Ms. Thomas1 belief that Mr. Sauer is a positive
role model.

However, that concern is simply a restatement of the

Court's impression of Mr. Sauer.
Mr. Thomas suggests that the above findings regarding Mr.
Sauer "illuminate" deficiencies in Ms. Thomas' parenting ability
and character.

If this is true, the Court did not express that

conclusion in its findings.

Mr. Thomas suggests that the

relationship shows that Ms. Thomas has an "inability to
subordinate her own pleasures to the needs of her children".
Likewise, this does not appear in the Court's findings.
The Court found that Mr. Thomas was a capable parent, and
offered a more stable environment to the children.

However, the

evidence suggesting that Ms. Thomas could not offer an equally
stable environment is, again, Mr. Sauer's character and
"influence".

The argument of Mr. Thomas is circuitous: "Mr.
5

Sauer is a bad influence.

Ms. Thomas looks upon him as a

positive role model. Therefore, Ms. Thomas is less stable because
Pedro Sauer is a bad influence."

Except for the findings

regarding Pedro Sauer's influence, it is clearly in the best
interest of the children that their principal custody continue
with Ms. Thomas.
Given the lack of findings to support any conclusion that
the relationship with Mr. Sauer either (1)

impairs Ms. Thomas 1

parenting ability; or (2) is not in the best interest of the
children, there are two conclusions that can be drawn.

Either

the Court overreacted to the finding of infidelity on the part of
Ms. Thomas or the Court made a custody award based primarily on
findings regarding Pedro Sauer!s character and nationality,
rather than the parenting ability of the childrenfs mother.
Either conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See Erwin
v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker v. Tucker,
881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d
1131,

1132-33 Utah 1986); and Rule 4-903, (3)(E)(vii) Code of

Judicial Administration).
III.
THE COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY FACTUAL
BASIS FOR THE TERMINATION OF ALIMONY AFTER
THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS BEGINNING WITH THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TEMPORARY ORDER.
The Appellant does not contest the amount of alimony
awarded. The Court has properly accounted for the three elements
necessary to establish the amount of alimony.

The Court

successfully accomplished its calculation of alimony "in an
6

attempt to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts or
luxuries essential to maintain customarily proper status or
circumstances." (Finding of Fact f 126). However, none of the
findings that relate to the amount of alimony explain why alimony
terminated after thirty-six (36) months (much less thirty-six
(36) months after the commencement of the temporary order).
Mr. Thomas1 conclusion that "apparently, the trial court
felt . . . " highlights the problem.

We are left to speculate

what the Court felt or was thinking.

In fact, there are no

findings and there is no evidence which would suggest that
circumstances of the parties were to change after thirty-six (36)
months from the entry of the temporary order in such a way as to
justify the termination of alimony.
Mr. Thomas goes on to speculate that Ms. Thomas had "some
temporary expenses to set up her new life." However, there is no
finding to support that suggestion and there is no citation to
the record, either.

Additionally, any "set-off" expenses would

have already been incurred during the pendency of this lengthy
case or could easily be paid from Ms. Thomas1 separate assets
which she was awarded.
Mr. Thomas also suggests that there was no showing that Ms.
Thomas could not meet her financial needs without alimony.
However, that is the very essence of the Court's finding
regarding alimony; a finding which is not contested by the
Respondent and not appealed by the Respondent.

7

This marriage was of longer duration than in Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), and produced one more
child than in the Thronson case.

In the absence of any facts

which would support a change of circumstances which could be
anticipated at the time of the trial of this case, alimony should
continue for a period of time allowed by the statute (equal to
the duration of the marriage) or until unanticipated events occur
which call for an earlier termination or modification3.
IV.
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED AS A MARITAL ASSET
RATHER THAN A HYBRID SEPARATE/MARITAL ASSET.
Assuming that the home had a value of $150,000 at the time
of the marriage, as a matter of law the Court should conclude
that it lost its identity as separate property.

Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) provides for commingling or
otherwise separate property as a result of the " . . . effort or
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property" by the other spouse.

Mortensen v.

Mortensen at 3 06 (citations omitted).
The facts of this case clearly distinguish it from other
cases where the finding of a hybrid separate/marital asset has
been upheld.

In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah

3

At page 21 of the Respondent's brief he suggests that one
explanation for the early termination of alimony is due to "the
fault of the parties". The trial Judge noted the provisions of
§ 30-3-5(7)(b) but did not go on to make any findings whatsoever
which would connect the fault of either party with the alimony
award much less explain how fault would impact the duration of an
alimony award.
8

App. 1994), the trial Court's finding of the hybrid
marital/separate interest was sustained.

However, in that case

the nature of the property was significantly different than in
this case.

In Schaumberg the property in question was an office

building owned by Mr. Schaumberg which had been improved during
the marriage with money obtained by a loan and repaid from
marital sources (Mr. Schaumberg's income).

The improvement to

the office building there did not approximate the improvements to
the house in this case.

In this case, the home was sixty five

percent (65%) constructed during the marriage with the personal
labor and assistance of Ms. Thomas. Additionally, the home was
placed in the parties' joint names and mortgaged in consideration
of the parties' joint promise to repay the loan.
The Court should be given leeway and discretion to determine
matters such as this, as well as other matters raised on appeal
in this case.

However, there must be parameters and limits.

These parameters and limits are set on a case by case basis in
matters such as this.

The Court should consider, particularly,

the nature of this asset, and the fact that it was predominately
constructed and paid for during the marriage (from marital
sources).

In addition, Ms. Thomas, by her effort, enhanced,

maintained and protected the property.

It should be concluded

that the Court's earlier pronouncement in Mortensen v. Mortensen,
supra and its subsequent cases were ignored by the Court.

While

there is no "bright line", this case is, as a matter of law, a
case for marital property.
9

Mr. Thomas argues that there are extraordinary circumstances
in this case exempting it from the requirements of Mortensen.
The Court found no such extraordinary circumstances.

Rather, the

Court simply made its finding to support a hybrid
characterization of the property.

THE VALUE OF BERT THOMAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
SHOULD INCLUDE THE MONEY, ON HAND AT
SEPARATION, WHICH WAS USED BY HIM TO PAY HIS
TEMPORARY SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
It is inconsequential whether the savings account of Bert
Thomas Construction Company is characterized as a marital savings
account, or a hard asset of Bert Thomas Construction Company.

In

either case, the Court concluded that the balance on hand at the
time of divorce would be controlling.

This is inequitable.

Mr. Thomas acknowledged that he used that money during the
pendency of the case to pay his support obligation pursuant to
the Court's temporary order.

(Trial Transcript, February 26,

1996, Page 122, Lines 8-19).

The average balance in the Bert

Thomas Construction Company account prior to separation was
approximately $39,000.

This has been reduced to $6,328 at the

item of trial (Plaintiff's exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, & 11 and Trial
Transcript, Volume 2, Pages 99-104).

The Court also found that

Mr. Thomas had "inexplicability" reduced his income, sharply,
during separation "regardless of the trend of residential
construction in Utah County, and the previous Bert Thomas
Construction trend."

(Findings of Fact paragraph 104).

The

inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Thomas artificially reduced
10

his receipts and income, and lived off of the available cash on
hand at the time of separation.
Mr. Thomas readily admits that he has used the cash to pay
his temporary support obligation.

He does not take issue with

the claim in the Appellant's principal brief that the use of
marital assets to pay a temporary support obligation constitutes
dissipation of that marital asset.

It was contemplated that Mr.

Thomas would pay his temporary support obligation out of his
earnings.

The burden was on Mr. Thomas to explain why his

earning reduced, in spite of his income trend, and the trend in
the industry.

He failed to do so.(Findings of Fact 5 104).
VI.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INCLUDED
COMPANY NET PROFITS IN THE RESPONDENT'S
INCOME
The Respondent appeals the Court's finding that Mr. Thomas
earned, on average, $69,567 per year for the years immediately
preceding the separation.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that

income reflected Mr. Thomas' minimum earning capacity based upon:
1.

His income history;

2.

The local trend for residential construction in Utah

County; and,
3.

The trend in Bert Thomas Construction Company revenues.

First of all, the Respondent objects to the Court's
inclusion of company net income and the total income figure.
Secondly, Mr. Thomas, apparently, disputes the Court's finding of
fact number 104 which states:
11

"Inexplicably and contrary to the
Respondent's own testimony, the actual Bert
Thomas Construction Company revenue has
declined sharply since separation regardless
of the trend of residential construction in
Utah County and the previous Bert Thomas
Construction trend, see Exhibit 13."
(Finding of Fact f 104).
Instead of the methodology utilized by Derk Rasmussen, CPA,
the expert for the Petitioner, the Respondent relies solely upon
his tax returns to establish his income.
Mr. Thomas agrees with the methodology utilized by the Court
(with the exception of including company net profits) which
adopted the methodology of Derk Rasmussen, CPA.

In determining

the Respondent's income the Court employed the formula set out in
§78-45-7.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which provides as
follows:
§ 78-45-7.5 Determination of Gross Income Imputed Income
(4)(a) gross income from self employment or
operation of a business shall be calculated
from subtracting necessary expenses required
for self employment or business operation
from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be reviewed to determine an
appropriate level of gross income available
to the parent to satisfy a child support
award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable
level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) gross income determined under this
subsection may differ from the amount of
business income determined for tax purposes.
(Emphasis added)
As will appear hereafter, the Respondent's appeal of the
Court's finding must fail because, among other reasons, he has
12

failed to marshal the evidence in support of the Court's finding
(see Point I, page 9, Brief of Appellee).
At the heart of the Respondent's argument is the allegation
that he "did not receive any benefit from that money", referring
to the corporate net profit, because it was kept in the
corporation.
1.

This reasoning is in error because:

As the owner of the company Mr. Thomas could withdraw

these funds at anytime and did so.
2.

These funds were kept in the construction company

savings account and actually withdrawn by Mr. Thomas during the
pendency of this case.
3.

Ironically, these are the same funds which were

dissipated by the Respondent during the pendency of this case
(see Point V of this brief and the Appellant's principal brief).
4.

The Respondent's argument leaves the impression that the

Court added back the cash reserve balance year after year to
determine the Respondent's income.

This is not the case.

The

Court simply included corporate net profits, not the entire
reserve account balance.

The cash reserve account reflected some

retained earnings or profits.

In any given year, some of the net

profits may have been disbursed to Mr. Thomas and the remainder
kept as

a reserve account or retained earnings.

Likewise, in

any given year (such as after separation) the Respondent could
and did draw upon the reserve account representing accumulated
net profit.

13

5.

Once the corporation had a reasonable cash reserve there

was no reason not to disburse net profit from subsequent years.
As of 1989 the corporation had nearly $30,000 in the bank.
Exhibit 9, tab E to the Addendum to Brief of Appellant).

(See

There

was no need to maintain any additional cash reserve or at least
the Respondent did not testify to any additional cash reserve
need.

Therefore, all net profit after 1989 could have been and

often was used by the Respondent.

(In fact, after the year of

the parties1 separation the company reserve account went steadily
downward until it reached an all time low for the period of the
accounting of under $8,000 at about the time of the trial).
While Derk Rasmussen, CPA did testify that the corporation
retained some of its net income he never testified that Mr.
Thomas "did not receive any benefit from that money"
(Respondent's Brief at page 11). Additionally, he testified that
he did not believe that it was good tax planning for the
corporation to retain net income.

(Trial Transcript, Volume 2,

Page 132, Lines 10-13).
The Court and Mr. Rasmussen both determined that there was
nothing illegal in how the books of the construction company and
the leasing company were kept.

The goal was to determine the

cash available to the Respondent within the provisions of §78-457.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which is different than the
IRS test for taxable income.

It is the IRS test for taxable

income that the Respondent asserts as the appropriate measure of
his income for child support and alimony purposes.
14

Mr. Thomas testified that the trend for gross revenues of
the company was steadily increasing up until separation.
Additionally, Mr. Thomas and Derk Rasmussen, CPA testified that
the trend in the area for residential construction was steadily
increasing.

(Finding of Fact, paragraph 104 and Petitioner's

Exhibit 13). In determining that the Respondent's sharp decrease
in income during the pendency of the case was "inexplicable", the
Court rejected the Respondent's testimony that his income was
affected by his new found paternal responsibilities or the fact
that Ms. Thomas no longer helped in the business4.

Obviously,

the Court had inadequate factual basis upon which to make its
finding.
CONCLUSION
The Court concluded and found that it was clearly in the
best interests of the children for Ms. Thomas to be awarded
custody except for one factor.

The Court, therefore, found

contrary to the clear weight of all of the evidence and awarded
custody to Mr. Thomas because of the "influence" of "Senor" Pedro
Sauer.

The findings regarding Mr. Sauer's "influence" and

character are based upon faulty and inconsistent findings
regarding criminal charges and charges of spouse abuse which were
not supported by any conviction or finding in any other
proceeding or by the evidence in this case.

4

More important, the

Ms. Thomas' involvement in the business is one of the
reasons she lays claim to the cash reserve account which existed
at the time of separation and was dissipated during the pendency
of the case. (See Point V herein).
15

Court's disapproval of Mr. Sauer included findings regarding his
nationality and the Court's personal experience with Brazilian
culture and its impact upon male members upon that society.
There was no evidence to link Mr. Sauer's influence with Ms.
Thomas' parenting ability or the best interests of the children.
The Court gave undue weight to its findings regarding Mr. Sauer's
character and influence.
The Court did not explain why alimony should terminate after
three years commencing with the temporary order in the case.
Absent some findings to support an early termination of alimony,
it should have continued until modified in subsequent proceedings
or limited by the Utah statute.
The home of the parties should have been categorized as a
marital asset.

This conclusion should have been made because of

the nature of the asset, the fact that it was substantially
constructed during the marriage, because it was owned jointly by
the parties, and mortgaged and paid for during the marriage with
marital funds.
The family corporation included almost $40,000 in cash at
the time of separation.

These funds were dissipated by the

Respondent in part to pay his obligation to the temporary order.
In addition, the Respondent lived off of those funds when his
income "inexplicably" and sharply dropped during the pendency of
this action.

These funds should have been included in the value

of the company and equitably divided between the parties.

16

The Court did not err in determining that Mr. Thomas earns
$69,557 dollar per year or has the capacity to do so based upon
his history and ability•

The Court did not err in including

company net profits in the cash available to the Respondent for
purposes of determining child support and alimony under the
applicable statute.

Mr. Thomas could withdraw and benefit from

those funds and, in fact, did so before and after separation.
DATED THIS

/^

day of November, 1998.
GREEN & BERRY

^FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the

[2—

day of

November, 1998, I served a copy of the attached Appellant's Reply
Brief upon Brent D. Young, Esq. the counsel for Appellee in this
matter by mailing a copy by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Avenue, P.O. Box 657, Provo, Utah

48 North University

84603.

CDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Appellant

18

-V

